Workmen\u27s Compensation—Full Faith & Credit—Provision for Exclusive Jurisdiction in Administrative Board.—Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co by Krumsiek, James B
Boston College Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 17
10-1-1965
Workmen's Compensation—Full Faith &
Credit—Provision for Exclusive Jurisdiction in
Administrative Board.—Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co
James B. Krumsiek
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James B. Krumsiek, Workmen's Compensation—Full Faith & Credit—Provision for Exclusive Jurisdiction in Administrative Board.—Crider
v. Zurich Ins. Co, 7 B.C.L. Rev. 174 (1965), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol7/iss1/17
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
these advertisers could and probably would shift to other types of televi-
sion commercials. It is submitted, however, that there is a trend in our
complex market economy toward great distances between buyers and sellers.
Demonstrative advertising is necessary to compensate for the informational
gap which results from this separation. Therefore, the alternatives facing
the Court in the towel hypothetical would be to (1) allow transmitting up
and the consequent consumer deception, or (2) forbid it, causing the buying
public to lose a large segment of desirable demonstrative advertising.
Returning to the decision in the instant case, similar economic ramifica-
tions may be seen. The majority, in forbidding the use of mock-ups, has
condemned makers of products which transmit down to the dilemma of
committing suicide by televising down or abandoning informative television
demonstrations.
It appears that the majority has placed on the television industry the
burden of improving technologically or losing a considerable segment of
demonstration advertising. It would further seem that any adaptation inside
the television camera or use of a colored filter over the camera lens to make
white transmit as white (or sandpaper transmit as sandpaper) would be a
permissible measure to compensate for the difficulties inherent in all light
transmission. But, both are manipulations of the truth and in effect are
no different than a mock-up. Yet, here the axe would fall, though the result
is the same and only the method employed in the studio is different.
In summary, the majority may have lost sight of the objective of sec-
tion 5, namely, the protection of the consumer. Its decision provides section
5 protection only to the consumer who needs no protection since he has
received exactly• what he expected, and places unreasonable burdens on
television advertisers and the television industry.
ROBERT J. USKEVICH
Workmen's Compensation—Full Faith and Credit—Provision for Exclu-
sive Jurisdiction in Administrative Board.—Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co. -1—
Petitioner, a resident of Alabama, was injured in that state while in the
employ of Lawler Construction, a Georgia corporation. At the time of injury
both he and his employer were under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation ,
Act.2 Petitioner brought suit against Lawler in an Alabama court under the
Georgia act and was awarded a default judgment. To enforce this judgment,
the petitioner instituted a diversity action against Zurich Insurance, the
workmen's compensation carrier for Lawler, in a federal district court in
Alabama. Zurich filed a motion to dismiss, contending that since the Georgia
act invested primary jurisdiction in the Industrial Accident Board of Georgia, 2
the Alabama court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the default
1 85 Sup. Ct. 769 (1965).
2 Ga. Code Ann. § 114 (1956).
3 Ga. Code Ann, § 54-108 (1960).
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judgment. The federal court granted the motion. 4 The court of appeals
affirmed5 and petitioner was granted certiorari. The Supreme Court° HELD:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state court in a suit
brought under the workmen's compensation act of a sister state to give effect
to a provision of the foreign act investing primary jurisdiction in an adminis-
trative board of the sister state.
The Court relied on Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 8
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,° and Carroll v. Lanza 1 °
in support of its decision. These cases marked a departure from the earlier
view established in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper.11 Under the earlier
view, a state could fix one exclusive remedy for personal injuries suffered by
its residents while within or without its borders and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause compelled other states to refrain from enforcing any remedy incon-
sistent with that provided by the home state.
The decision in Alaska Packers allowed an employee to obtain from the
court of his state of residence a remedy different from that provided by the
compensation act of the state of injury despite the employee's prior agreement
to be bound by the remedy afforded by the state of injury. Exclusive remedies
were not at issue there, and the significance of the case lies in the Court's
permitting the state of residence to invoke its own remedy to defeat the em-
ployment agreement voluntarily made by one of its citizens with a foreign
employer. Recognition was given to the interest of the state of residence in
opening its courts to provide relief for its own citizens, and that interest pre-
vailed over the foreign state's interest of protecting and enforcing valid con-
tracts made within its borders.
A scant four years later, the Bradford decision was further qualified in
Pacific Employers where the Court allowed California, the state of injury, to
apply its own workmen's compensation act when a Massachusetts resident
sought relief for injuries sustained while working on a temporary assignment
in California. The employee was regularly employed in Massachusetts by a
Massachusetts corporation; and at the time of the injury, he and his employer
were under the Massachusetts Corporation Act, which purported to give an
exclusive remedy regardless of the place of injury. That decision weighed the
conflicting interests of the state of injury and the state of residence and
determined that the state of injury was not precluded from utilizing its own
act even though confronted with an exclusive act of a sister state. The interests
which the Court there recognized were: bodily and economic protection of
those working within the forum state, the exclusive provision of its own act,
and the convenience of providing California citizens with a local remedy for
4 224 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
5 324 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1963).
6 Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart dissented on the ground that the Court
should not have reached the constitutional question.
7 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
8 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
9
 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
10 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
11 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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payment of bills incurred by the injured employee. The Massachusetts
interests which were relegated to subservience included the exclusive provi-
sion of its statute and recognition beyond its borders of employment contracts
entered into by one of its private citizens with one of its corporate citizens.
Carroll v. Lanza was a further extension of this trend. There the Court
held that a resident of Missouri, injured while working in Arkansas, was not
bound by the Missouri Compensation Act—which purported to grant an
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained within and without its borders—and
Arkansas could grant common law damages in addition to the remedy pro-
vided by the Missouri act. In deciding Carroll, the Court again balanced the
conflicting interests of the state of injury and the state of residence and
allowed the interests of the former to prevail.
In the present case, the Court was confronted with an entirely different
factual situation in two respects. Here the employee chose to seek his remedy
under the foreign compensation act, not under the law of the state of injury
and residence; and the act with which the Court was concerned not only
embraced the foreign state's desire that its remedy be respected as exclusive
by sister states, but also provided that an administrative board be invested
with exclusive jurisdiction for damage assessment of injuries sustained by
employees both within and without its borders. It would seem that these dif-
ferences were substantial and that the earlier decisions were not precedent for
the present result. Specifically, the question in the earlier decisions 12 had been
whether the state of injury had sufficient interest to apply its own compensa-
tion act or grant common law damages when the act of the sister state, under
which the employer and employee were operating, purported to provide an
exclusive remedy. The Court's affirmative holdings on this question in Pacific
Employers and Carroll were in no way determinative of the question presented
by the case at bar, namely, whether the state of residence and injury, once
asked to apply a sister state's compensation act, could disregard a provision
in the act investing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative board.
The Court emphasized that "the compensation acts of either jurisdiction
may, consistently with due process, be applied in either" 13 and that "as the
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case teaches, she [the state of injury] may
supplement or displace it [the foreign act] with another, insofar as remedies
for acts within her boundaries arc concerned.'" 4
 The quoted passages, however,
must be read in connection with the factual situations which were before the
Court at the time: in both cases the Court was neither asked to apply the act
of the foreign state nor faced with a provision in the foreign act purporting
to invest exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative board. Moreover, it would
be an unrealistic extension of either "supplement" or "displace," as used
in the Carroll case, to enable the decision to fall within the scope of those
words.
The present decision, not compelled by the cases cited in its support,
12
 This does not include Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc, Comm'n, supra
note 8. As previously stated, exclusive provisions were not at issue there.
13
 Id. at 544.
14 Carroll v. Lanza, supra note 10, at 413-14.
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might find justification in the earlier case of Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co. 15
or in a balancing of the interests of Alabama and Georgia.'
In the Wells case, which appears more closely in point than any case cited
by the Court," the majority indicated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not compel a state to adopt any particular set of conflict of laws rules, but
only set "minimum requirements" to be observed by the forum state when
interpreting a sister state's law." The Court failed to identify the minimum
requirements made essential under the Constitution and established only
that the forum state could apply its own statute of limitations even though
the foreign statute under which the action had been brought had its own
limitation period. The Wells case, however, seems questionable support for
the present result. In the first place, the Court in Wells declined to couch its
decision in terms of whether the limitation period was so intimately connected
with the right that it had to be enforced along with the right;" and only on
this reasoning could the Wells case lend support to the present decision.
Second, the Wells Court felt its decision was compelled by the prevailing
rule set down by previous cases "that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not compel the forum state to use the period of limitation of a foreign state." 2°
There appears to be no prevailing rule as to a provision in the foreign act
investing exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative board.
In the Pacific Employers case, which abolished the automatic sub-
serviency of the state of injury to the public act of the state of residence, due
consideration was given to balancing the interests of the states. The Court has
committed itself to be the arbitrator of each such conflict and has indicated
that the weighing factors will be the "competing public policies involved."21
It has described such conflicts not only as conflicts between the public poli-
cies of two or more states, but as "a more basic conflict of the strong unifying
principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward
maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or
recognized by the statutes of sister states" and a conflicting policy within the
forum state.22
The Court in the present case did recognize the various interests of
Alabama:
15 345 U.S. 514 (1953). The Court in the present case dismissed this case in a brief
footnote.
10 Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914) (Holmes, 5., dis-
senting) lends no support to the present decision. There the tribunals which were vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the statutory right—the state courts—had a prior and
separate existence and thus were not intimately related to the right. In the present case,
however, the board was specially created by the statute creating the right and the board's
sole purpose was the administration of the statute; thus the right and the enforcing body
were intimately related.
11
 It appears more closely in point in that the forum state was there asked to apply a
sister state's law.
15 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., supra note 15, at 
.516,
12 Id. at 517.
20 Ibid.
21
 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951): "It is for this Court to choose in each
case between the competing public policies involved." Id. at 611.
22 Id. at 612.
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"The State where the tort occurs certainly has a concern in the prob-
lems following in the wake of the injury. The problems of medical
care and of possible dependents are among these. . . ." The State
where the employee lives has perhaps even a larger concern, for it
is there that he is expected to return; and it is on his community
that the impact of the injury is apt to be most keenly felt. 23
These interests would have justified Alabama in ignoring the Georgia act
altogether and in applying its own compensation act or in granting common
law damages; for as the Carroll and Pacific Employers decisions point out, the
interests of Alabama as the state of injury and residence were at least com-
mensurate with Georgia's interest in having its act applied. However, once
Alabama had been asked to apply Georgia's act and sought to apply the act,
these interests were no longer operative against Georgia's interest in having
the provisions of its act uniformly applied. H this were not so, when an
injured employee asked the state of his injury or his residence to apply the
workmen's compensation act of a sister state, these interests would justify the
state of residence or injury in deleting any provNion of the foreign act, thus
making a shambles of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
One interest not considered by the Court, but alluded to in Alaska
Packers, might possibly have provided some basis for ignoring the provision
of Georgia's act: Alabama's interest in supplying its citizens with a con-
venient forum in which they can enforce their rights of action. However, this
position assumes that the right is not intimately related to the enforcing body,
and it is not initially clear that this is so. 24 Moreover, it is generally recognized
that the right to workmen's compensation rests upon the statute which both
creates and measures that right 2 3
 In the present case, Georgia measured its
statutory right to workmen's compensation with the requirement that the
injured employee bring his claim before an administrative board; recovery on
Georgia's statutory right to compensation, then, depended on compliance with
this requirement.
It seems, therefore, that an opposite result in the present case would have
been more proper. Neither the three cases relied upon by the Court nor the
Wells decision lend any support to the present result. Moreover, whatever
interests Alabama bad were already sufficiently protected by the Pacific Em-
ployers and Carroll decisions and certainly were not sufficient to prevail over
Georgia's interest in maximum enforcement of its statutory rights and obliga-
tions.
JAMES B. KRUMSIEK
23
 Supra note 1, at 770.
24 See note 16 supra.
26
 See Flynn v. Union City, 32 N.J. Super. 518, 108 A.2d 629 (1954) ; State ex rel.
Koger v. Industrial Comm'n, 48 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) ; Gerber v. State Indus-
trial Acc. Comm'n, 164 Ore. 353, 101 P.2d 416 (1940) ; Rogers v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
135 Tex. 149, 139 S.W.2d 784 (1940) ; Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 83
S.E.2d 728 (1954).
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